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ARGUMENT
1.

MSI AND ALTA RAISE NEW ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
THIS APPEAL, EACH OF WHICH SHOULD BE REJECTED.
At the outset, this Court should note that MSI and Alta raise three brand new

arguments in their appeal brief and ask this Court to take judicial notice of documents
outside the record. They characterize these as issues of "standing." First, they argue The
View was involuntarily dissolved as a corporation. (Aplees. Br. at 14-15; Aplees.
Addend. Ex. 2.) Second, they argue The View is not successor in title to The View
Associates, Ltd. (Aplees. Br. at 15-16.) Third, they suggest The View has sued the
wrong defendants. (Aplees. Br. at 26-28.)
This Court generally does not consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). Nor does this Court
consider evidence not presented below. See id. Nor does this Court opine on arguments
not presented or reached in the district court. See id. MSI/Alta's offerings violate each
of these basic tenets of appellate practice in this Court.
Judicial notice is not properly invoked here either. In the case cited by MSI/Alta
on pages 15 and 27 of its brief, the Sixth Circuit looked specifically to prior case law
establishing the propriety of judicially noticing administrative decisions. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers v. Zantop Air Transp.
Corp., 394 F.2d 36, 40 (611 Cir. 1968). No similar showing is made here.
As MSI and Alta note, this Court may render its decision based on "any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^[ 18, 29
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P.3d 1225, 1230 (emphasis added). MSI and Alta, however, have stepped outside the
record and should not be rewarded for using such tactics. The View should have the
opportunity to meet evidence under the rubric provided by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure with its attendant discovery procedures. Presumably, MSI and Alta would
have been required to designate documents under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a) and otherwise
allow The View the opportunity for appropriate discovery and development of argument
in the district court. MSI/Alta concede this was not done. (Aplees. Br. at 26.)
In an effort to minimize the newness of their arguments, MSI/Alta, without citing
any authority, couch each of the new arguments they now raise as issues of "standing."
However, contentions regarding capacity to sue, chain of title, and ownership of property
are not "standing" questions. They are factual issues which have not been developed or
adjudicated in the trial court and are not part of the record. Standing concerns itself with
whether the proper party is before the Court adjudicating claims. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Department ofEnv 7 Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 984-87 (Utah App. 1993).]
MSI and Alta also contend these issues call into question the courts' "subject
matter jurisdiction." (Aplees. Br. at 14.) The issue of a party's standing to bring claims
is one of justiciability, not judicial power. This Court indisputably has subject matter
jurisdiction over this appeal, a conclusion MSI and Alta effectively agreed with when

1

As the Sierra Club case shows, "standing" has been raised for the first time on appeal in
cases of private parties seeking to enforce public rights. Even if the issues here were
properly characterized as related to ''standing," they involve enforcement of private
rights. MSI/Alta cite no case holding that such questions can or should be raised for the
first time on appeal.
243 279676v2
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they adopted The View's opening jurisdictional statement. (See Aplees. Br. at 1; Aplt.
Br. at 1.) As shown more fully below, MSI/Alta's contentions are each factual or legal
arguments that could have been made below but are now waived. The View will address
each contention more particularly in turn.
The View Condominium Association's Corporate Status. MSI/Alta argue that The
View lacks the legal capacity to sue because it was involuntarily dissolved in 1988. Utah
R. Civ. P. 9(a) expressly provides:
When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued . . . he shall do so
by specific negative averment which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on
such issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal
existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(Emphasis added.) Here, MSI/Alta never argued below that The View lacked capacity to
sue and never challenged below The View's "legal existence," let alone by specific
negative averment with supporting particulars.
The Utah Supreme Court has held repeatedly that Rule 9(a) prohibits a party from
challenging a party's legal existence or capacity at any late stage of the proceedings. In
Phillips v. JCMDevelopment Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), the court held that the
defendant's failure to raise below wca specific negative averment of plaintiff s lack of
capacity to sue" resulted in a waiver of defendant's right to raise the issue. Id. at 884.
The court refused to consider the issue for the first time on appeal.
The court went further in Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d
743 (Utah 1982), where it held that defendant's failure to challenge plaintiffs capacity to

243 279676%2
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sue until the last day of trial resulted in a waiver of the defense. The court noted that
"notice and the resulting opportunity to respond are the critical factors in requiring
compliance with Rule 9(a)(1)." Id. at 748. That notice, moreover, "must be definite and
clear." Id. Here, MSI/Alta gave The View no notice that they "desire[d] to raise an issue
as to the legal existence" of The View. The failure to raise the issue until their brief on
appeal is, as a matter of law, a waiver of that argument.
Even if MSI/Alta had not waived any such challenge, their argument is meritless.
"Dissolution of a corporation does not. . . prevent commencement of a proceeding by or
against the corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (enacted
1992). That code provision, which was in effect at the time this suit was filed in 2000,
governs The View's capacity to sue. See, e.g., Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah
App. 1998) (court applies law in effect at time action initiated). Because Utah law
plainly provides that The View was not barred from commencing a lawsuit, MSI/Alta's
challenge to The View's capacity fails.
Ultimately, The View can bring suit as a condominium management committee
regardless of its corporate status. The Declaration which The View seeks to enforce
specifically provides that "any Maintenance Association . . . shall have the right to
enforce compliance with the Project Documents in any manner provided by law or in
equity." (Aplt. Addend. Ex. 2, p. 29, § 7.1; R. 391.) A "Maintenance Association" is
defined in the Declaration as "any incorporated or unincorporated association of Lot or
Unit Owners . . . which is formed by operation of law or by the execution and filing of
certain documents to facilitate the management, maintenance and/or operation of any
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statute, and, as a result, the Court "should not confer an advantage upon a [party] who
may have wrongfully damaged the corporation." Id. at 830.
In sum. MSI/Alta's corporate capacity argument should be rejected on all fronts.
The View as Successor in Title. Next, MSI and Alta question whether The View
is properly considered the "successor in title" to The View Associates, Ltd., which was
the original purchaser of Lot 8. This is not correctly characterized as a question of
standing. Rather, this is an issue of fact that was raised but not disputed below, passed on
by the district court favorably to The View, and not appealed by MSI or Alta. Only
MSI/Alta's argument on appeal is new.
The district court's order (the form of which was prepared by MSI/Alta)
concluded unequivocally that The View Associates, Ltd. was The View's "predecessor in
interest." (Aplt. Addend. Ex. 1, at 3; R. 590.) This was taken as an "undisputed fact."
(Aplt. Addend. Ex. 1, at 2; R. 589.) Neither MSI nor Alta has cross-appealed from or
previously questioned that determination.
Indeed, evidence in the record shows MSI and Alta at all times affirmatively
alleged this point and treated The View as the proper entity affected by their actions. In
their Motion for Summary Judgment below, MSI and Alta stated as an undisputed
material fact that "Plaintiff [The View] is a successor in title from The View Associates,
Ltd. via a deed recorded on, or about, January 4, 1985 . . . from Sorenson Resources
Company ('SRC')." (R. 340, emphasis added.) MSI and Alta consistently acknowledged
The View Associates, Ltd. as "plaintiffs predecessor in title" and "plaintiffs predecessor
in interest." (R. 342.) In correspondence to The View, Alta recognized the property
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rights at issue as belonging to ""Ilie View Condominiuiri Owner's Association." (R. 541.)
Moreover, the Definitive Agreement between MSI and Alia anticipated legal action by
The View owners. (1evidence ai *'
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In sum, the new arguments avail MSI/Alta nothing even if considered on then
merits. The Court should make clear in its ruling on this case that attempts to add new
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substantive arguments on appeal are improper and a waste of judicial and litigant
resources and should award The View its appeal costs for having to respond.
II.

MSI/ALTA'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING LOT 5 IGNORE THE VIEW'S
KEY POINTS IN THIS APPEAL.
A.

Summary Judgment For MSI/Alta Cannot Be Sustained on this
Record.

Turning to the merits of this case, MSI and Alta fail to address the principal points
made in The View's appeal. The View has clearly shown that (1) the plain language of
the Restrictive Covenants applies by its terms to the Amended Plat; (2) the Restrictive
Covenants are real covenants that run with the land; and (3) the deeds to both The View
and MSI incorporate the terms of the Restrictive Covenants. Moreover, the Amended
Plat itself refers specifically to the Restrictive Covenants, clearly confimiing the relevant
intent as to their continuing viability. Each of these points is overlooked in the MSI/Alta
response.
1.

MSI and Alta Ignore the Plain Language of the Restrictive
Covenants.
a.

MSI/Alta's Arguments Run Afoul of Utah's Rules for
Construing Restrictive Covenants.

The Restrictive Covenants explain the method for effecting their amendment.
(Aplt. Addend. Ex. 2, at 50-51 §§ 13.1, 13.2, 13.4; R. 412-13.) Without ever discussing
this governing language, MSI and Alta take the position that "the Amended Plat had the
purpose and legal effect of amending the CC&Rs." (Aplees. Br. at 16.) They cite no
legal authority for the proposition.

243 279676x2
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This argument runs directly contrary to the plain language of the Restrictive
Covenants. The Restrictive Covenants apply by their terms to all amended plats. (Aplt.
Addend. Ex. 2, at 5 § 1.19, 6 § 1.25; R. 367, 368.) If merely amending the plats were to
amend the Restrictive Covenants, both the Declaration's written amendment
requirements and the express language applying the Restrictive Covenants to amended
plats would be rendered meaningless. Moreover, no provision in the Restrictive
Covenants provides for amendment of the document by merely amending the plat. This
Court will not reach strained, nontextual results when construing and harmonizing
contractual provisions. See, e.g., Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 2001 UT App 287, ^
14, 33P.3d 1078, 1081.
A centerpiece of MSI/Alta's argument is that the Declaration reserved to Sorenson
the right to change the location, boundaries, and dimensions of the lots, and that Sorenson
in fact did so. This is undisputed. Sorenson amended the plat but not the Restrictive
Covenants governing the plat. The Restrictive Covenants expressly apply to the plat "as
the same may be amended from time to time." (Aplt. Addend. Ex. 2, at 6 § 1.25; R. 368.)
A fortiori, the restrictive parking covenant remains on Lot 5 (i.e., "New Lot 5").2 This
reflects hornbook law on restrictive covenants.

2

MSI and Alta use a "New Lot'7"01d Lot" designation when discussing each aspect of
this dispute. These designations are helpful for historical purposes, but they do not
change the application of the Restrictive Covenants. As shown in the Appellant's
Opening Brief and again here, the Restrictive Covenants apply by their terms to "Lot 5"
as reflected on the plat as amended: i.e., "New Lot 5."
2-n 27%76\2
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As for the law, MSI and Alta have all but ignored it. Because the Restrictive
Covenants are unambiguous on their face, the Court need only read their plain English.
See, e.g., Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ^ 11, 998 P.2d 807, 811. MSI/Alta's attempt
to go behind this ordinary language runs afoul of basic tenets of Utah contract decisions.
See, e.g., Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah App. 1995) (court
should not look beyond four comers of contract document if language is unambiguous).
Even "where restrictive covenants are susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations, the intention of the parties . . . is ascertained from the document itself and
the language used within the document." Swenson, 2000 UT 16, ^ 11, 998 P.2d at 811.
MSI/Alta's reliance on evidence outside the four corners, including contradictory
testimony, is simply improper.
MSI/Alta's case law citations, such as they are, serve only to prove The View's
points. MSI and Alta cite, for example, Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners'

Ass 'n, 656

P.2d 414 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that tc[p]lats recorded with condominium
declarations are enforceable." (Aplees. Br. at 21.) Actually, the Rowley court construed
the effect of a plat by reading the restrictive covenants. See 656 P.2d at 417. Moreover,
Rowley was a decision reached on findings of fact after a full evidentiary trial. See id.
MSI and Alta also misapply key language from Claremont Property

Owners

Ass 'n, Inc. v. Gilboy, 542 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. App. 2001), a case that is very much on point.
Quoting from that case, MSI and Alta make the remarkable argument that "the Amended
Plat [in the instant case] was not 'intended to be subject to the [CC&Rs] already in
existence." (Aplees. Br. at 21.) In making this argument, they ignore the undisputed

243:27%76v2

\Q

facts that (a) the Amended Plat itself references the Restrictive Covenants and notes that
the Restrictive Covenants reserve easements "OVER ALL OF THE PROJECT"; (b)
MSFs own conveyances of lots platted in the Amended Plat say they are subject to the
Restrictive Covenants; (c) The View's deeds say their conveyances of lots are subject to
the Restrictive Covenants; and (d) the Restrictive Covenants themselves say they apply to
all amended plats. (R. 233-34, 368-69, 417-18, 420.) MSI/Alta's legal argument utterly
fails in light of this undisputed evidence.
To avoid the insuperable difficulties arising from the controlling documents, MSI
and Alta suggest "all the circumstances of the transfer must be considered" in
determining the underlying intent of the grantor. (Aplees. Br. at 18.) They cite two Utah
Supreme Court decisions in support. (See Aplees. Br. at 18 (citing Clotworthy v. Clyde,
265 P.2d 420 (Utah 1954); Russell v. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Co., 423 P.2d 487,
490 (Utah 1967)). Their argument ignores three points of law.
First, the cases they cite were both decided after a trial on the merits, not on
summary judgment. The cited cases serve merely to highlight the impropriety of granting
MSI/Alta summary judgment here.
Second, as already shown in this section, the law of contracts forbids resort to
extrinsic evidence unless the language of the instrument is ambiguous, as it was in those
cases. The language of the Restrictive Covenants is in no way ambiguous. Here, the
language of the Restrictive Covenants and of the deeds of conveyance unambiguously

1

Nowhere does the Amended Plat so much as suggest it was intended in any way to
supercede or otherwise render void the Restrictive Covenants. (R. 420.)
24^ 27%76\2
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favor The View, requiring summary judgment in The View's favor and making summary
judgment against The View inappropriate.
Third, if the Court is to consider "alP the circumstances of the conveyances, it
cannot ignore and discount on summary judgment the plain language of the documents
evidencing the intent of the parties that the Restrictive Covenants continue to apply to the
Amended Plat.
With such evidence apparent in the record, the district court lacked the proper
evidentiary basis on which to dispose of this question as a matter of law against The
View. In the face of such evidence, especially, MSI and Alta could not properly meet on
summary judgment the heightened burden of showing by clear and convincing

evidence

that the Restrictive Covenants were unenforceable. See Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 773,
775 (Utah 1977). Indeed, they do not even argue the point, as Utah case law is
unequivocal that summary judgment is wrongly granted when such language is present.
See, e.g., Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1972).
In sum, MSI/Alta's arguments consistently run afoul of basic tenets of Utah
contract law. By simply applying the law as it should be applied - construing and
enforcing unambiguous Restrictive Covenants by their plain terms and correctly applying
the summary judgment standard to that construction - the Court should conclude that
reversal is required.
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b.

MSI and Alta Cannot Establish "Abandonment" or
Unenforceability of the Restrictive Covenants as a Matter of
Law on this Record.

Relying on evidence outside the four comers of the governing documents,
MSl/Alta next argue that testimony from Walter Plumb evidences the parties' intent to
eliminate the easement specifically granted in the Restrictive Covenants. (Aplees. Br. at
22.) However, Utah law is clear that in this context the subjective intent of the grantor is
irrelevant if not expressed in controlling language in the governing documents. See
Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass X 1999 UT 62,fflf14-25, 987 P.2d 30,
33-36. If Sorenson had intended the result MSI and Alta argue for now, it could easily
have said so at the time in the documents. Because no language to that effect appears in
the Restrictive Covenants (let alone in the Amended Plat), and because this evidence
contradicts the Restrictive Covenants" unambiguous plain language, the district court
erred in relying on such testimony. (R. 590-91; Aplt. Addend. Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.)4
Even if the testimony relied on by MSI/Alta in this appeal were admissible, it
merely ''constitutes evidence" for the trier of fact; it does not form the basis for summary
judgment. See Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, H 21, 998 P.2d 807, 813 (quoted in
Aplees. Br. at 22-23). A finder of fact may well reject self-serving testimony that makes
no sense and is given in exchange for a release of fraud claims, an evidentiary reality well

MSI/Alta point also to similar testimony from Russell Watts, which likewise falls
outside and contradicts the import of the governing documents. (Aplees. Br. at 22.)
Watts' affidavit was submitted to the district court for the first time with MSI/Alta's final
reply memorandum below, giving The View no chance either to respond to it or to take
appropriate investigative discovery. (R. 579-81.) The district court properly did not rely
on this affidavit in rendering its decision. (R. 590-91; Aplt. Addend. Ex. 1, pp. 3-4.)
243 27%76\2
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established in this Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209,
1217 (Utah 1996) (trier of fact "entitled to weigh the evidence and reject all or part of any
witness's testimony"); (see also R. 474, 479, in which The View challenged Walter
Plumb's testimony below).
The case law relied on by MSI/Alta also fails to demonstrate that the law entitles
them to a judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). MSI and Alta rely on Swenson v.
Erickson. 2000 UT 16, \ 21, 998 P.2d 807, 813. (Aplees. Br. at 22-23.) The rule in
Swenson derives directly from this Court's holding in Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah
App. 1995). See Swenson, 2000 UT 16, U 27, 998 P.2d at 814. It focuses on repeated and
substantial violations of a covenant as the touchstone for abandonment:
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"The case law is uniform that before an abandonment of a covenant may be
found there must be 'substantial and general' noncompliance with the
covenant." Id. ^j 22. at 813.

•

A covenant must be "habitually and substantially violated." Id.

•

'The violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness of the
covenant and support a finding that the covenant has become burdensome."
Id.

•

"If the original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished and
substantial benefit will continue to inure to residents, the covenant will
stand." Id.

•

"Evidence of abandonment must be established by clear and convincing
evidence." Id.

•

Where "the contemplated benefits to the plaintiff still exist" the covenant
"has neither ceased nor become useless." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535
P.2d 1256, 1261 (Utah 1975)).
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No evidence of repeated covenant violations, let alone of a clear and convincing
nature, appears in the summary judgment record here. Nothing in the record exists to
show the parking covenant has ever been "'violated" because Lot 5 has never been
developed. Moreover, the contemplated parking benefits to the plaintiff still clearly exist.
The "abandonment'" argument is also contradicted by the express terms of the
Restrictive Covenants, which provide that "[fjailure by . . . any Owner or Maintenance
Association^ to enforce any covenant or restriction herein contained shall in no event be
deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter." (Aplt. Addend. Ex. 2, at 29 § 7.1; R.
391.) The conclusion that a party has given up rights in the face of a contradictory
express reservation of rights can hardly be sustained on summary judgment against the
party reserving its rights. See, e.g., Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah
App. 1995) (noting this is a "highly fact-dependent question," especially given existence
of express non-waiver provision in contract).
Finally, "'[abandonment of one covenant does not suggest abandonment of other,
albeit similar, covenants in the agreement." Fink, 896 P.2d at 655 (citing Tompkins v.
Buttrum Constr. Co., 659 P.2d 865, 867 (Nev. 1983) (holding violations of other
covenants had no effect on covenant at issue)). Thus, even if other conditions had
changed, no abandonment of the parking covenant has been shown to have occurred.
c.

MSI and Aha Mischaracterize The View's Arguments.

The View urges enforcement of the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants to
property within the Sugarplum development. Contrary to MSI/Alta's argument, this is
not a "creeping restrictive covenant" of the type prohibited in Dansie v. Hi-Country
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Estates Homeowners Ass 'n, 987 P.2d 30, 34 (Utah 1999). In Dansie, the homeowners
association tried to apply restrictive covenants to a landowner outside the covered
development. The Dansie court arguably reached the right decision in holding that such
a landowner was not affected by covenants that did not apply to him.
To try to fit within Dansie*s holding, however, MSI/Alta argue that the parking
covenant does not apply to "'the entire Sugarplum development." (Aplees. Br. at 24.) By
its own terms, all of the Restrictive Covenants are binding on and enforceable by all the
Sugarplum owners and tenants and by their representatives, and in particular by The
View on Lot 8 and MSI on Lot 5 because they were referred to in their deeds:
Any easements or air space rights referred to in this Declaration shall
be deemed reserved or granted as applicable, or both reserved and granted,
by reference to this Declaration in a deed to any Lot.
This Declaration shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on the
successors and assigns of the Declarants, and the heirs, personal
representatives, grantees, tenants, successors and assigns of any Owner.
The Master Association, any Maintenance Association or any Owner
shall have the right to enforce compliance with the Project Documents in
any manner provided by law or in equity . . . .
(Aplt. Addend. Ex. 2, at 49 §§ 12.6, 12.7, 29 §7.1; R. 411, 391.)
MSI/Alta also claim The View's "unfounded assumption" is that "the Lot
designated '5* in [the] Amended Plat corresponds in some fashion to the Lot with that
number in the [original] Plat." (Aplees. Br. at 27.) This does not fairly characterize The
View's position. The View contends rather that Lot 5 of the Amended Plat ("New Lot
5") is governed by the unambiguous Restrictive Covenants. This position is supported by
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the governing documents and the controlling law. The district court's refusal to apply
that law to the unambiguous Declaration in question was legal error.
MSI and Alta further argue that "Old Lot 5" is the parking area for "New Lot 8"
and so The View has gotten what was contemplated originally. (Aplees. Br. at 23.)' In
making their argument, MSI/Alta suggest that "the exact boundaries of Old Lot 5 were
set out in the Plat, which was incoiporated by reference in the CC&Rs." (Aplees. Br. at
23.) This rationale, if adopted by the Court, requires reversal: the exact boundaries of
"New" Lot 5 were likewise set out in the Amended Plat, which was likewise
"incorporated by reference" in the CC&Rs. By the force of MSI/Alta* s own reasoning,
then, the metes and bounds delineation of "New Lot 5" and its incorporation into the
Restrictive Covenants control - especially since the Amended Plat indisputably
superceded the original Plat.
Finally, MSI and Alta argue that the terms of the Amended Plat were incorporated
in the deed to The View Associates, Ltd. (Aplees. Br. at 19.) So were the Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 417-18.) How the Court on summary judgment could properly ignore the
terms of the Restrictive Covenants under this scenario is not explained.
2.

MSI/Alta Fail to Refute that the Lot 5 Parking Covenant Runs
with the Land.

In its Opening Brief, The View showed the Court the Lot 5 parking covenant is a
real covenant that runs with the land. (Aplt. Br. at 19-21.) MSI and Alta have not argued

5

This is less than true: c'01d Lot 5" also overlaps uNew Lot 9" (which belongs to MSI)
and wCNew Lot 6." (See Aplees. Br. at 7-8.)
2-H 27%76\2
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to the contrary, nor could they in light of the unequivocal language in the Restrictive
Covenants. Their failure to respond in any meaningful fashion waives any substantive
argument on this point. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is
well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party
has failed to adequately brief."); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), 24(b).
Conceding that the parking restriction is a covenant running with the land, MSI
and Alta argue only that such covenants may nevertheless become unenforceable. They
cite as support this Court's decision in Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1995).
As already discussed in part II.A. 1 .b, supra, the abandonment rule articulated in Fink
(and adopted by the Supreme Court in Swenson) does not apply here. In Fink, this Court
affirmed summary judgment declining to enforce a restrictive shingling covenant when
23 of 81 houses in the subdivision had violated the covenant without retributive
enforcement. See id. at 653-54. The Court held that, as a matter of law, the "violations
are so great as to lead the mind of the average [person] to reasonably conclude that the
restriction in question has been abandoned." Id. at 653 (internal quotations omitted).
In the instant case, in contrast, there have not been repeated violations of the Lot 5
parking restriction. The lot has remained undeveloped until the present. MSTs recent
expression of intent to develop it in contravention of the Restrictive Covenants fomented
this litigation, litigation that was specifically anticipated in the MSI/Alta agreement. (R.
444.) Such intent to develop was formed only after MSI settled litigation with Alta in
which Alta took the position that the very claims MSI advances here were "specious,"
and then entered into an agreement with Alta to which The View was not a party.
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Covenants running with the land generally have an indefinite life. See, e.g.,
Thayer v. Thompson, 611 P.2d 787, 789 (Wash. App. 1984). In this case, the restrictive
parking covenant on Lot 5 has a specifically articulated life of 50 years. (R. 412; Aplt.
Addend. Ex. 1, p. 50 ^ 12.12.) The dormancy of the need to invoke the Restrictive
Covenants does not affect its enforceability. Thus, it is immaterial that this Covenant
"was not asserted for almost 20 years before this case." (Aplees. Br. at 25.) Restrictive
Covenants would be useless if, by the mere passage of time, they could not be enforced
the first time they were put to the test. The View's need for parking is no less important
because of its futurity, and its rights were not threatened until the MSI/Alta development
plan was struck in contravention of the Restrictive Covenants. Under these
circumstances, the argument that a finding of "abandonment" is appropriate on summary
judgment is not well taken.
3.

The Restrictive Covenants are Specifically Incorporated by
Reference in the Lot 5 and Lot 8 Deeds to MSI and The View.

The deeds to both MSI and The View incorporate by reference the Restrictive
Covenants. (R. 234, 417-18.) Nevertheless, MSI/Alta fail even to discuss the governing
Utah case law holding that summary judgment against The View is therefore
inappropriate.
Instead, they argue that because the deed to The View's predecessor incorporated
both the Plat and the Amended Plat in its legal description these descriptions must be
harmonized to discern the grantor's intent. They conclude that the Amended Plat must be
viewed as superseding the Plat, "thereby amending the CC&Rs." (Aplees. Br. at 19.)
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The View agrees the Amended Plat superseded the original Plat; but it does not follow
that the Restrictive Covenants were thereby amended. MSI and Alta repeat this
erroneous non sequitur numerous times in their briefing without supporting record or
legal citations. This Court should reject it for the incorrect statement of law it is.
Were the Court to agree with MSl/Alta's argument that the parking right remains
attached only to "Old Lot 5," then the district court's decision still requires reversal.
"Old Lot 5"comprises portions of "New Lots 6 and 9" as well as part of "New Lot 8."
(See Aplees. Br. at 7-8.) Neither MSI nor Alta has suggested a reason why only that part
of "Old Lot 5" lying on "New Lot 8" would be restricted. Their own analysis would
require a different outcome than the district court's.
In sum. The View's meritorious arguments remain untouched by anything
advanced in this appeal by MSI or Alta. The plain language of the documents, the legal
effect of a covenant running with the land, and the undisputed incorporation of the
Restrictive Covenants into the deeds demand reversal of the district court's summary
judgment decisions. Judgment as a matter of law should be granted The View based on
the unambiguous controlling language of the governing documents.

6

MSI/Alta's harsh rhetoric about what The View "failed to tell the District Court," what
The View's "real aim" is, what The View's "absurd" argument is, along with similar
disparaging remarks made throughout their briefing, is unhelpful and, in truth, has no
place in reasoned appellate review. (Aplees. Br. at 21'-28, passim.)
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B.

MSI/Alta's Factual Argument Highlights the Impropriety of Granting
Summary Judgment in their Favor.

Reduced lo its essence, MSI/Alta's argument reveals itself as a series of factual
contentions. Relying on selected record citations while ignoring others, MSI and Alta
argue what Sorenson's fcCintenf was in amending the plat and transferring title to the
deeds. Standing squarely in contradiction to their arguments are (1) the plain language of
the Restrictive Covenants; (2) the unrefuted evidence the Restrictive Covenants were to
run with the land; (3) the language of the deeds ; and (4) the language of the Amended
Plat itself.
MSI and Alta argue the evidence as if this were the closing of trial. But this Court
is not to weigh the evidence on summary judgment nor resolve disputes in the record.
MSI and Alta have not shown the evidence they argue is undisputed - it is not. In fact,
the material evidentiary disputes pointed out in The View's Opening Brief, which stand
in the way of summary judgment for MSI/Alta, have not even been addressed.
If this Court does not peremptorily enter summary judgment for The View based
on the enforcement of the unambiguous language of the governing documents, it is
compelled by the state of the record to reverse and demand for a resolution of these fact
conflicts.
III.

MSI/ALTA MAKE A PURELY FACTUAL ARGUMENT ON THE LOT 9
RECORD.
MSI/Alta's discussion of The View's Lot 9 legal claims is also peppered with

factual argument, including argument based on disputed facts. MSI and Alta do not
respond to The View's showing of disputed material facts. (Aplt. Br. at 27-28.) The
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Court views all such facts in the light most favorable to The View. See Beehive Brick
Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989). Doing so demonstrates
the impropriety of granting summary judgment for MSI/Alta on this record.7
Estoppel: Alta recognizes that estoppel may arise by acts, representations,
admissions, or silence which intentionally or negligently induce another to believe certain
facts exist. (Aplees. Br. at 34.) There is ample such evidence that, for 15 years, Alta
considered and represented Lot 9 as designated for snow storage for The View, and as
such would not allow development of Lot 9 by MSI. This evidence has been carefully
catalogued in The View's Opening Brief and includes Alta's position in litigation against
MSI that MSI's contrary argument was "specious." (Aplt. Br. at 27-28.)
Alta also argues that no record evidence exists of reliance by The View. (Aplees.
Br. at 33, 35.) To the contrary, The View submitted an affidavit from William T. Levitt,
a long-term resident of the Town of Alta, an owner of a condominium unit in The View,
and The View's Association President for many years. (R. 523.) He averred that since
construction of The View condominium building in 1985, The View had used Lot 9 to
store snow during the winter months and that at no time had the owner of Lot 9 objected
to the use of Lot 9 for snow storage. (R. 523.) Moreover, correspondence from Alta's

7

Because of MSI/Alta's failure to discuss the evidence, The View does not repeat all
such evidence here, as it was set out in full in The View's Opening Brief. (Br. of Aplt. at
27-28.) Rather, The View focuses its argument on the principal legal issues raised by
MSI, addressing them in the order it addressed them in its Opening Brief. (Br. of Aplt. at
29-31.)
24^ 279676\2

22

own counsel to The View acknowledges both The View's reliance and the importance of
this reliance. (R. 541-42.)
Notably, estoppel is asserted not only against Alta, but also against MSI.
Nevertheless, MSI fails even to brief the issue, waiving any argument it may have.
Easement: The thrust of the district court's decision was that no dedication or
easement had been ''recorded." (Aplt. Addend. Ex. 1. at 4; R. 591.) The View has shown
that recordation is not a prerequisite to land use dedication when a party has actual notice.
(Aplt. Br. at 30.) The record evidence shows Alta and MSI had actual notice of the use
of Lot 9 for snow storage, which was insisted on by Alta over MSI's protestations. The
district court's decision therefore should be reversed.
Taking: MSI and Alta argue that The View's expectation of a continued right to
snow storage on Lot 9 was ^unilateral." (Aplees. Br. at 37.) To make this statement,
they ignore all the record evidence in which Alta seconded The View's position.
MSI/Alta also make the bald assertion there is "no evidence" that The View's
interest would be abridged to any substantial degree by any action on the part of Alta.
They wholly ignore the evidence set out in The View's Opening Brief discussing Alta's
own correspondence threatening The View with an injunction prohibiting possession and
use of its property. (R. 541-42.)
Contract: Alta argues it would be uabsurd" to suggest that Alta would govern land
use decisions by contract, as such a result ''extinguishes the police power on which all
Utah municipalities rely to establish and enforce ordinances or regulation governing land
use." (Aplees. Br. at 31.) However, this is precisely the underlying basis for Alta's
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development decisions with MSI. (R. 437-48.) Those parties entered into a contract
purporting specifically to govern land use, including, among other things, "Snow
Removal and Storage Requirements." (R. 437-48.) "Absurd" as this may seem, the
Alta/MSI relationship is now governed at least in part by contract - not necessarily to the
exclusion of police power, but at the very least, as an independent enforceable right.
Alta makes a selective factual argument focusing primarily on a statement made
by Alta Town Administrator John Guldner. (Aplees. Br. at 32.) Alta highlights portions
of his statement and downplays other parts. Alta simultaneously ignores other similar
statements that are more concrete. Summary judgment on such a selective review of the
o

record is insupportable.
Lastly, Alta points again to the Russell Watts affidavit stating lhat he understood
the snow storage area on Lot 9 was temporary. (Aplees. Br. at 33.) This affidavit was
submitted by Alta in its reply memorandum below and was properly not relied upon by
the district court. See supra note 4. Moreover, the subjective understanding of Mr. Watts
is subject to cross-examination, does not square with the facts that have developed in the
intervening 18 years, and is contradicted by other evidence.

8

Alta also makes the immaterial argument that "the ministerial acts of municipal
employees are not binding." (Aplees. Br. at 32 n.12.) This argument should be rejected
because (a) this is not a ministerial act, and (b) regardless whether his statements are
binding, they constitute evidence of the understanding of the Town of Alta, which a fact
finder could consider in the overall mix of evidence.
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In sum, the factual disputes permeating the Lot 9 issue require reversal and
remand for further evidentiary proceedings. It was legal error for the district court to
enter summary judgment given this record.
CONCLUSION
The district court's erroneous decision should be reversed. Judgment should be
granted to The View as a matter of law with respect to the Lot 5 parking covenant, based
on the unequivocal, unambiguous language of the Restrictive Covenants. Alternatively,
the language of the controlling documents creates, at the very least, a factual dispute that
cannot be resolved against The View on summary judgment, but requires submission to a
finder of fact. Finally, the issues regarding Lot 9 are inherently factual and are
vigorously disputed. Summary judgment on this record was inappropriate. This Court
should reverse the district court's decisions, remand as needed, and assure that the law of
restrictive covenants is not ignored in the Utah courts.
DATED this / * / ^ d a y of January, 2004.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

By:

s

Robert E. Mansfield
Stephen K. Christiansen
Attorneys for Appellant The View Condominium
Owners Association

J

MSI/Alta's request for costs on appeal is spurious and should be rejected, with appeal
costs awarded to The View.
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William H. Christen sen
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Exhibit A

&7St
4191670
DECLARATION OP CONDOMINIUM
OP THE
THE VIEW CONDOMINIUM PROJECT

This Declaration of Condominium, hereinafter referred to as
the "Declaration" is made and executed this 21sc day of January,
193C\ by The View Associates, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership,
hereinafter referred to as the "Declarant."

A.
Description of Land. The Declarant is the owner of the
following-describeJ parcel of land, hereinafter referred to as the
"Land," which is located in the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah:
23JL?*l

Is

Lot 8, SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit Development, as the
same is identified in the Plat recorded November, 26,
1984, as Entry Ho. 4019736, in Book 84-11 of Plats, at
page 181, of Official Records? and in the Master
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
of SUGARPLUM^ a Planned Unit Development, recorded
August 12, 1983, as Entry No. 3830328, in Book 5482, at
pages 1173 through 1230, of Official Records.

Parcel 2>
A portion of Lot
? 3UGAFPLJ&, a Planned Unit
Development, as the same is identified in the Plat
recorded November 26, 1984, as Entry No. 401S736, in
Book 84-11 of Piatt, at Page x81 or Official Records,
and in the Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and
Restrictions
of
SUGARPLUM,
a
Planned
Unit
Development, recorded August 12, 1983, as Entry No.
3830328, in Book 5482, at Page 1173 through 1230 of
Official Records.
Being more particularly described as follows:
U3GINNING at a point which is South 315.40 feet and
&ast 710.10 fast from a 2 inch steel pipe placed in the
rock kern of Corner #2 of the Black Jack Mining Lode
Claim! Survey #5298, said claim corner being located
South 32%13#19M West 3377.23 feet, more or less, from

the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 3 Souta,
Ranga 3 East, oalt Lake Base and Meridian, said point
of beginning being North 67*20'00" West 14.00 feet from
the Southeast corner of Lot 8, SU3ARPLUM PLAT, and
running thence South 72*09*53M West 36.75 feet; thence
North 38*28'02" West 49.44 feet; thence South 67*20*Q0H
East 71>23 feet to the point of BEGINNING.

Parcel 3>
A Perpetual Easement and Right of Way for a parking
area and/or parking structure being described as
follows:
BEGINNING at a point which is South 129.78 feet, East
802.79 feet and South 22'40' West 22.00 feet from a 2
inch fiteel pipe placed m the rock -em of Corner #2 of
the Black Jack Mining Lode Claim, Survey #5288, said
claim corner being located South 32'13'19" West 3377.23
feet, more or less, from the Northeast corner of
Section 6, Township 3 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; and running thence North 67*20' West
49.00 feet; thence North 22%40' East 18.00 feet; thence
South 67%20f East 49.00 feet; thence South 22%40f West
18.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
ALL PARCELS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING:
A Right of Way for ingress and egress over and across a
Portion of Lot 4 described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is the Southwest Corner of
Lot 4 and the Northwest Corner of Lot 5 of Sugarplum
according to the official plat thereof as recorded in
•:he office of the Salt Lake County Recorder as entry
Mo. 4019736 in Book 84-11 at page 181 and running
uhence from the point of beginning N 22% 20'00" W 31.47
feet; thence N 22x40*00" E 154.70 feet; thence S
67%20'Q0M E 22.25 feet; thence S 22 % 40 , 00 H W 176.95
'ieet to th« point of beginning. Thifi Right of Way is
intended to provide property owners with ua*e of an
existing roadway that crosses a portion of lot 4.
Together with a rJght and easement of use and enjoyment
in and to the Coi'aon Areas and Facilities, as described
in and provided for in thw Plat and Master Declaration
of
Covenants,
Conditions,
and
Restrictions
of
SUGARPLUM, a Planned Unit Development.
Except in»9 all minerals in or under said parcels
including, but not limited to, metals, oil, gas, coal,
stone and mineral right*, mining rights, and easement

.2~

rights or other m a t t e r s
express or implied.

relating

thereto

whether

B.
Building
and
Improvements<
The
Declarant
has
constructed or will construct on the Land a certain Building and
other improvements as shown on che Map referred to belc*.
C.
Record of Survey M a p . T h e Declarant intends to e x e c u t e ,
a c k n o w l e d g e a n d record in t h e o f f i c e of t h e County R e c o r d e r of
Salt Lake County, State of U t a h , a certain instrument p e r t a i n i n g
to the Project a n d e n t i t l e d "Record of Survey M a p for T h e V i e w , a
Utah Condominium Project."
D.
Intent and Purpose. The Declarant intends by recording
this Declaration and the Map to submit the Land, the Building and
all other improvements situated in or upon the Land to the
provisioas of the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, as amended, Utah
Code Annotated, Secticn 57-8-1, gjfc seq. (hereinafter referred to
as the "Condominium Act") as a fee simple Condominium Project and
to impose upon said property mutually beneficial restrictions
under a general plan of improvement for the benefit of all
Condominiums within said Project and the Owners thereof.
NOR, THEREFORE, the Declarant does hereby make the following
declarations

ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
1.01
Defined Terms, Unless the context clearly irdicates
otherwise, certain terms as used in this Declaration shall have
the meanings set forth in this Article I.
1*02
"Association" shall *nean The View Condominium Owners1
Association, Inc., a Utah nonprofit corporation, organized to be
the Association referred to herein.
1.03 "SQlfd Of TEVtSteta" shall mean the governing board of
the Association which constitutes the management committee under
tl*x Condominium Act a n d which shall b $ appointed or elected in
a c c o r d a n c e with the Declaration and in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the
Artie"er of Incorporation and Bylaws of The View Condominium
Owner** Association,
Inc., attached hereto as Exhibit H B" and
M W
Exhibit
C
respectively, and incorporated herein by this
reference.

S
cr*
£J
4$
^
£*
*»*

b»
1*04
"Building" shall mean the Building in the Project
containing o n e or more Units that h a s beam or will be constructed
on the Land, as such Building is shown on the M a p .
•3-

1.05
"Common Areas" shall mean all physical portions of the
Project except all Units*
1.06
"Common Expense Fund" shall mean the fund created or to
be created pursuant to the provisions of Article IX of this
Declaration and ia;3 which all monies of the Association shall be
deposited.
1.07
"Common
Facilities"
shall
mean
all
fu* iture,
furnishings, equipment, facilities and other property
, nal,
personal or mixed) and interests therein at any time *ea**dr
acquired, owned or held by the Association for the use and benefit
of the Owners and all other property (realf personal or mixed)
hereafter purchased in accordance with this Declaration with
monies from the Common Expense Fund,
Common Facilities shall be
deemed to be part of the Common Areas, except to the extent
otherwise expressly provided in this Declaration,
1.08
"Condominium" shall mean a Unit and the undivided
interast
(expressed as a fraction of the
entire
ownership
interest) in the Common Areas appurtenant to such Urit, as set
forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference made a
part hereof.
1.09
"Condominium Act" shall mean the Utah Condominium
Ownership Actj Utah Code Annotated (1953)* as amended/ Section
57-8-1 9 fit S£fl«
1.10
"Declarant" shall mean The View Associates. Ltd.,
Utah limited partnership and its successors and assigns.
1.11

a

"FHA* shall mean the Federal Housing Administration.

1.12
"FELMC"
Corporation.

shall

mean

the

Federal

Home

Loan

Mortgage

1.13
"First M o r t g a g e " shall mean a Mortgagee which is a
bank or savings and loan association or established mortgage
comi^any, or other entity chartered under federal or statu laws,
any corporation or insurance company or any federal or state
agency which has a first mortgage lien on any Condominium in the
Project.
"CUqlblt
EitlLfc MfiJL^;fl&flJi£f, shall mean any
First
Mortgagee who has requetted nor. let of those certain matters
referred to in Section 14.01.
1.14
*EM*SAH
Association.

shall

mean

ivie

Federal

National

Mortgage

H
1*1?>
LiJld" Hhall meat, the !<anci upon which the Project is
situated, as more particularly dencribfid in Paragraph h of the
recitals above.
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1.16
"Lease" shall mean any agreement for the leasing or
rental of the Project.
1.17
"frimited Common Areas" shall mean any Common Areas
designated as reserved for use of a certain Unit or Units to the
exclusion of the other Units in the Project or reserved for future
assignment by the Board of Trustees for the use of a certain Unit
or Units to the exclusion of the other Units in the Project*
Structural separations between Units or the space which would be
occupied by such structural separations may become Limited Common
Areas for the exclusive use of the Owner or Owners of the Units on
either side thereof as provided in Section 4.03 hereof.
All
perKinq stalls or storage facilities that are identified on the
Map as Limited Common Areas shall be assigned by the Board of
Trustees to one or more units for the exclusive use of such unit
or units.
1.18 "Manacer" shall mean the person, firm or company, if
m y . designated from time to time by the Association to manage, in
whole or in part, the affairs of the Association and the Project.
1.19 "Mftp" shall mean the Record of Survey Map for The View,
a Utah Condominium Project, recorded concurrently with this
Declaration, and any Supplemental Maps pertaining to the Project
and recorded or to be recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
1.20
"Master Association" shall mean and refer to the Sugar
Plum Master Homeowner's Association, a Utah nonprofit corporation
comprised of the Association and all other
"Maintenance
Associations" (as that term is defined in the Master Declaration).
1.21
"Master Declaration" shall mean the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Sugar Plum, a planned
unit development4* at filed of record with the Salt Lake County
Recorder and as amended from time to time.
1.22 "Mortgage" shall mean any mortgage or deed of trust by
which a Condominium or any part thereof is encumbered.
"First
Mftrtq^gf* shall mean any first mortgage or deed of trust by which
a Condominium or .any part thereof is encumbered.

w

^•23
"Moytqacee" shall mean (i) any persons or entities
named *.s the mortgagee or beneficiary under any Mortgage or Deed
of Trust by which the interest of any Owner is encumbered, (ii)
any successor to the interest of such person or entity under such
Mortgage or D*ed of Trust or (iii) any insurer or guarantor of
such person or entity under such Mortgage or Deed of Trust.

J^
Zj
£C
*~
5
L*
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1.24

"Mortgage Insurer" shall mean FHA or VA.

1*25 "Mortgage Servicer" shall mean a Mortgagee <-mo services
any Mortgage or Deed of Trust on any individual Condominium in tae
Project on behalf of FHLMC and/or FNMA.
1.25 "Owner" shall mean the person or persons, including tne
Declarant, owning in fee simple a Condominium in tne Project, as
2ucn ownership is shewn by tne records of the County Recorder cf
Salt Lake County, State of titan. The term "Owner" snail not refer
co any Mortgagee (unless such Mortgagee has cDtair.ed title in fee
simple to a Condominium pursuant to a yudiciai or nonjudicial
action, including, without limitation, a foreclosure proceeding or
any deed or other arrangement in lieu of foreclosure) or to any
person or persons purchasing a Condominium under contract (until
such contract is fully performed and legal title conveyed of
record)•
1.27
"Project" shall mean the Land, the Building and all
improvements suomitted by this Declaration and tne Map to the
provisions of the Condominium Act.
1.28
"Total Votes of the Association" shall mean the 4;otal
number of votes appertaining to all Condominiums in the Project,
as shown in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
1.29
"Unit" shall mean an individual air .space unit,
consisting of enclosed rooms occupying part of a Building and
bounded by the unfinished interior surfaces of the walls, floors,
ceilings, windows and doors along the perimeter boundaries of the
air space, as said boundaries are shown on the Map, together with
ail the fixtures and improvements therein contained.
Paint and
other wall, ceiling or floor coverings on interior surfaces shali
be deemed to be part of the Unit. Notwithstanding the fact that
they may be within the boundaries of such air space, the following
a~e not part of a Unit insofar as they are necessary for the
support or for the use and enjoyment of another Unit:
Bearing
walls, floors, ceilings and roofs (except tne interior surfaces
r.nereof), foundations, ceiling equipment, tanks, pumps, pipes,
vents, ducts, shafts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other
utility installations, except the outlets thereof wh*n located
witnin' the Unit. The interior surfaces of a window or door mean
*-r:e points at which such surfaces are located wnen the window or
ci^or 13 closed.
:.30

"VA" shall mean the Veteran's Administration.
11 r

^
g
^
<5

a

^T
Y»
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insurance on the Project or any part thereof nor shall anything be
done or kept in any Unit that would increase the rate of insurance
on the Project or any part thereof over that which 'ihfe
Association, but for such activity, woultf pay. Nothing shall b%
c!ona or kept in any Unit or in the Common Areas or any par thereof which would be in violation of any statute, rui<s~
ordinance, regulation, permit or other validly imposed requirement
of any governmental authority.
No damage to, or waste of, the
Common Areas or any part thereof shall be committed by any Ovrer
or guest of any Owner, and each Owner shall indemnify and v;>ld
harmless the Association and the other Owners from and against all
loss resulting from any such damage or waste caused by sue^ Owner
or by the guests, tenants, licensees or invitees of such C*> i<*r.
5.09
Compliance with Master Declaration, Each Owner *hall
be subject to the covenants, conditions and restrictions oi the
Master Declaration, including but not limited to its pzsvisions
regarding lock-out in the event of avalanche or the threat
thereof, ?o*td maintenance, Master Association assessments and all
other provisions thereof.
Each Owner is also subject to the
"Inter Lodge19 procedures established, from time to time, by the
Town of /utai.
6.10
Rales and Regulations,
Each Owner shall comply
stiicMy with all rules and regulations adopted by the Association
for the governance of the Unitsfi th*? Common Areas and the Project,
as such rules and regulations may be modified< amended end
construed by the Association in tne sole discretion of its Board
of Trustees.
6.11
CP^3tmcUpP PeriQd Exemption.
During the course of
actual construction of any permitted structures or improvements
within the Project, the provisions, covenants, conditions and
restrictions contained in this Declaration shall be deemed waived
to the extent necessary or convenient to permit such construction;
provided, however, that during the course of such construction
nothing shall be done which will result in a violation of any said
provisions, covenants, conditions or restrictions upon completion
of the construction.

ARTICLE VII
THE ASSOCIATION
7.01 Membership. Each Qwnur shall be entitled and required
to be a member of the Association.
Membership will b#gin
immediately and automatical!/ upon becoming tkn Owner and shall
terminate immediately and automatically upon censing to be an
Owner. If title to a Condominium is hald by wort than one person,
the membership appurtenant to that Condominium shall be shared by
-14-

all such persons in the same proportionate interest and by the
same type of tenancy in which title to the Condominium is hold.
An Owner shall be entitled to one membership for each Condominium
owned by him.
Each membership shall be appurtenant to the
Condominium to which it relates and shall be transferred
automatically by conveyance of that Condominium. Ownership of *
Condominium within the Project cannot be separated from membership
in the Association
appurtenant
thereto, and
any
devise,
encumbrance* conveyance or other disposition, respectively
of th*
Owner's membership in the Association and rights app rtenant
thereto. No person or entity other than an Owner may be a rsestbcr
of the Association, and membership in the Association may not be
transferred except
in connection with the transfer
of a
Condominium. The Association shall make available to the Owners,
Mortgagees and the holders, insurers and guarantors of the First
Mortgage on any Unit current copies of the Declaration, Articles,
Bylaws and other rules governing the Project and otlvsr books,
records and financial statements of the Association.
The
Association also shall be required
to make available
to
prospective purchasers of Units current copies of the Declaration,
Articles, Bylaws, other rules governing the Project and the most
recent annual financial statement of the Association, if such is
prepared.
"Available" shall mean available for inspection, upon
request, during normal business hours or under other reasonable
circumstances.
7.02
Board of '?r^steea»
Until such time as the
responsibility for , le^ine the Trustees of the Association is
turned over to the Owners in accordance with Utah law, the
Declarant shall have the exclusive right to appoint and to remove
all such Trustees. This exclusive right shall terminate after the
first to occur of the following:
(a) Three (3) years from the date on which the first
Condominium in the Project is conveyed; or
(b) After Condominiums to which seventy-five percent
(75%) of the undivided interest in the Common Areas appertain
have been conveyed by Declarant to the purchasers thereof.
7.03 Right of Board of Trustees to.•..Bind. Association. Until
such time as the responsibility for electing the Trustees of the
Association is turned over to the Owners in accordance with
Section 7.02, the Board of Trustees shall not have any authority
to enter into any contracts, agreements or leases (with the
exception of utility serivce contracts) on behalf of the
Association, either directly or inditectly, unless s^ich contracts,
agreements or Leasee may be terminated by the Association at any
time without cause or penalty at any time after such transfer of
control, upon thirty (30) day** prior written notice.
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7.04
Votes.
The number of votes appurtenant to each
respective Condominium shall be as set forth in Exhibit "A.H The
number of voces appurtenant to each Condominium as set forth in
said Exhibit "A" shall have a permanent character and shall not be
altered without the unanimous written consent of all Owners
expressed ir, a duly recorded amendment to this Declaration.
7.05 Master Association. The Association shall be a member
of the £*'4*:er Association formed pursuant to the provisions of the
Master Declaration. The Master Association shall own and maintain
the Common Areas and Facilities of Sugarplum, a planned unit
development ("Sugarplum"), as described in the Master Declaration,
including any recreational amenities which may be constructed in
the future for the use and enjoyment of the Owners as well as the
owners of all other lots and condominium units in Sugarplum
7.06 rJipliCJCflUon- The provisions of this article VII may
be amplified by the Articles and the Bylaws; provided, however,
th<- - no such amplification shall substantially alter or amend any
of the rights or obligations of the Owners set forth in this
Declaration. The initial Bylaws of the Association shall be in
the form of Exhibit M C M .

ARTICLE VIII
CERTAIN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION
AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES
8.01
The Common Areas. The Board of Trustees, acting on
behalf of the Association and, subject to the rights and duties of
the Owners as set forth in this Declaration, shall be responsible
for the exclusive management and control of the Common Areas and
all improvements thereon (including the Common Facilities) and
shall keep the same in a ^ood, clean, attractive, safe and
ianitary condition, order and repair; provided, however, that
unless otherwise stated herein, each Owner shall keep the Limited
Common Areas de«iqnated for use in connection with his Unit, if
any, in a cleau, sanitary and attractive condition.
The
Association shall be responsible for the maintenance and repair of
the ext%^ior of the Bui.VHng, other improvements and grounds,
including, without limitation, painting thereof, repair and
replacement of exterior trim, roofs and fences and maintenance or
parking areas, landscapingr walkways and driveways. The Board of
Trustees shall also be responsible for maintenance, repair and
replacement of Common Areas within the Building, including,
without limitation, landings, stairways, utility lines, Cousin
Facilities and ail improvements and other items located within or
used in connection with the Cosaion Areas. The specification of
duties of the Board of Trustees with respect to particular Cosason
Areas shall not be construed to limit its dut:.es with respect to
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other Common Areas. All goods and services procured by the Board
of Trustees in performing its responsibilities under this section
shall be paid for with funds from the Common Expense Fund.
8.02 Manager. If required by an Eligible First Mortgages,
th£ Board of Trustees shall retain &t all times the services of an
experienced,
professional
Manacs*
to
manage
the
Project.
Appropriate fidelity bond cove-a*, s shall be required for any
employee of the Manager who hanc **s~ funds of the Association. The
Board of Trustees may by written contract delegate in whole or in
part to e Manager such of the duties, responsibilities, functions
and powers hereunder of the Board of Trustees as are delegable.
The services of any Manager retained by the Board of Trustees
shall be paid for with funds from the Common Expense Fund. Any
management contract, employment contract or lease of recreational
or parking areas or facilities, or any contract or lease,
including franchises or licenses, to which the Declarant is a
party which binds the Association either directly or indirectly
shall provide that without cause such agreement may be terminated
by the Board of Trustees or the Association, without penalfy at
any time after transfer of control by the Declarant, upon not Tiore
than ninety (90) days1 written notice to the other party thereto.
Any such agreement shall provide that it is terminable upon thirty
(30) days' written notice for cause if it is an agreement
negotiated by the Declarant. The terms of any such agreement may
no<- exceed one year* renewable by agreement of the parties for
successive one-ye^r periods.
8.03
MiSS£lian£i2iia SPP<3S an<} Sgrvjg<?9»
The Board o£
Trustees may, in behalf of the Association, obtain and pay for the
services of such personnei as the Board of Trustees shall
determine to be necessary or desirable for the proper operation of
the Project, whether such personnel are furnished or employed
directly by the Association or by any person or entity with whom
or which it contracts. The Board of Trustees may, in behalf of
the Association, obtain and pay for legal and accounting services
necessary or desirable in connection with the operation of the
Project or the enforcement of this Declaration.
In addition to
tne foregoing, the Boar? of Trustees may, in behalf of the
Association, acquire and pay for out of the Common Expanse Fund
water, sewer, garbage collection, electrical, gas and other
necessary or ^esir<3ibl«> utility services for the Common Areas (and
for the Units to the e.'^nt not separately metered oi billed),
insurance, bonds ami otht»r goods and service* common to the Unit».

•»

8.04 BMl-Jir'ii^
The Board of Trustees a*}- cA
acquire and hold »>n beK'fii.f 1: f the Association real, personal and
S|
mixsd property of ail c^\mn for the use or benefit of all of the
&
Owners *nd may dispose >C such property by sale or otherwise,
5
provided that any acquisition or disposition of any real, person*!
or auxed property by *hi> Board of Trust*«s wherein the value of fcj
such property exceeds Fiv& Thousand Dollars ($3,000) must be jB
-1 -

approved by a vote of at least fifty-one percent H 51V, of the
Total Votes of the Association at a meeting duly called for that
purpose. All such property, including Common Facilities, shall be
paid for out of the Common Expense Fund and all proceeds from the
disposition thereof shall be part of such fund.
8.05 RuifeS and Regulations. The Board of Trustees may make
reasonable rules and regulations governing the use of the Units,
the Common Areas, the Limited Common Areas aid all parts of the
Project, which rules and regulations shall bs consistent with the
rights and duties established by this Declaration. The Board of
Trustees in behalf of the Association may take judicial action
against any Owner to enforce compliance with such rules and
regulations or other obligations of such Owner arising hereunder,
or to obtain damages for noncompliance therewith, as permitted by
law. In the svcnt of such judicial action, the Association shall
be entitled to recover its costs, including reasonable attorneys1
fees, from the offending Owner.
8.06 Granting Easements. The Board of Trustees may, without
the vote or consent of the Owners or of any other person, grant cr
create, on such terms as it deems advisable, easements, licenses
and rights-of-way over, under, across and through the Common Areas
for utilities,/ roads and other purposes reasonably necessary or
useful for the proper maintenance or operation of the Project.
8.07
Statutory
Duties
and
Powers.
All
duties,
responsibilities, rights and powers imposed upon or granted to the
"management committee" or to the "manager" under the Condominium
Act shall be duties, responsibilities, rights and powers of the
Board of Trustees hereunder.
8.08
Implied Rights.
The Association may exercise any
right, power or privilege given to it expressly by this
Declaration or by law, and every other right or privilege
reasonably implied from the existence of any right or privilege
given to it herein or reasonably necessary to effectuate any such
right or privilege.
8.09
PQWSg Qf AttPrntY and Amendments*
Each Owner makes,
constitutes and appoints the Association his truv* *^d lawful
attorney in his name, place and ste*d to make/ exr-^te, sign,
acknowledge and file with respect to the Project sue1 amendments
tc this Declaration and the Map as may be required by law or by
vote taken pursuant to this provision of the Declaration.

-38-

ubstantial destruction by fire or other casualty or in tne case of
a taking by condemnation or eminent domain.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, th > undersigned Declarant has
this Declaration the day and year first above written.

o\-j\re^

DECLAR^Ji•
The View Associates, Ltd., a
Utah Limited r rt lership
By The View, " •. , its
General Partnt

-46-

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
0n

t ie

*
"*\
day of January, 1986, personally appeared before
me Russell K. Watts and Michael D. Swenson, who being by me duly
sworn did say, that they the said Russell K. Watts and Michael D.
Swenson are the President and Secretary of The View, Inc., a Utah
corporation, the general p^ tner of The View Associates, Ltd., a
Utah limited partnership, u j that the said instrument was signed
in behalf of said Corporation by authority of its Board of
Directors and Russell K. Watts and Michael D. Swenson duly
acknowledged to me that said Corporation executed the same on
behalf of The View Associates, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership.

;

My Commission Expires:
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* r /\

•*' ^y*

THE TOWN OP ALTA, a body corpcrata and politic, in which Tht
Viaw Condominiums, r> Utah condominium projact, is locatad, by «nd
through its duly authoriied
MAyoff/uTf///JHoas haraby giva
final approval to tha said Projact, to tna fSragoiny Dtclaration*
to tha Racord of Survay Map rtcordad concurrently harawith, and to
tha attributas of tha said Projact which ara mantionad in Saction
57-8-35(3) of tha Utah Condominium Ownarship Act, as amandad and
axpandad by tha laws of Utah, 1975, Chapter 173, Saction 18*

DATEDx

I jl^Uk
TOWN Of ALTAJ

»y^C^- r>''/&rt f*y»x
STATE OF UTAH

)
i as,
COOMTY Or SALT LAKE )
0x1

thii

1 1- &*Y of lTAA;i*6ir\r
# 1!>S6, paraonally
apoaarad bafera ma
•J^tUiarYvfl > ir^ljH • — „ ' "*° ** in « *Y ••
d ly aworn, did say that ha la tha
MAyne
of tha Town of
Aita, and that ha aionad tha foragorng Approval by propar
authority and on bahaIf of tha Town of Alta, and ha did
acknowladga to ma that tha Town axacatad tha aama*

""•.<),
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